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Disproportionate Insider Control and the Demand for Audit Quality 
 
We examine the relationship between disproportionate insider control, enabled through dual-class 
share structures, and the demand for audit quality. Using a comprehensive hand-collected sample 
of U.S. dual-class firms, we find that, consistent with outside shareholders’ increased demand for 
external monitoring, as well as self-bonding by entrenched insiders, disproportionate insider 
control is positively associated with the propensity to hire a Big 4 or industry specialist auditor, 
auditor independence, and audit fees. Corroborating a self-bonding explanation, additional 
analyses show that audit quality mitigates the negative association of disproportionate insider 
control and firm value. In expanded analyses, we also investigate the separate effects of insider 
voting and cash flow rights on the demand for audit quality in dual-class firms. Consistent with 
general agency theory, we find a decreased (increased) demand for audit quality from incentive-
alignment (entrenchment) effects of ownership.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
We examine the relationship between disproportionate insider control, enabled through 
dual-class share structures, and the demand for audit quality. Dual-class equity structures that 
provide for the possibility of disproportionate insider control have increased considerably in the 
U.S capital market. In a typical dual-class firm, one class of shares carries more votes than the 
other class, while both classes have comparable cash flow rights. Because corporate insiders nearly 
always hold the superior class, dual-class shares enable insiders to exert disproportionate control 
due to the possession of voting rights in excess of their cash flow rights.  
Firms that maintain a dual-class structure of shares have grown rapidly in the U.S. capital 
market.1 In 2005, only a mere 1% of firms going public in the U.S. adopted a dual-class structure 
of shares. By 2014, the number of dual-class IPOs had increased to 15%. In 2015, the proportion 
reached 24%. On an industry basis, this development is even more staggering. Of all technology, 
media and telecommunications companies going public in 2015, a majority (56%) of such firms 
 
1 In a parallel development, equity structures that enable disproportionate insider control are also increasing in several 
European markets due to recent legislation providing for enhanced (typically double) voting rights for long-term 
shareholders, so called “loyalty shares.” In France, for instance, the Florange Act of 2014 provides for the automatic 
granting of double-voting rights to registered shares held for at least two years. ISS (2015) estimates that more than 
fifty percent of French companies now issue shares entitled to double voting rights. In 2014, Italy also passed a similar 
law enabling the creation of loyalty shares.  
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adopted a dual-class structure (Feldman 2016). In total, dual-class firms comprised about 6% of 
all U.S. public firms in the 1995-2002 period (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2010), but now account 
for 8.7% of companies included in the Russell 3000 index (Equilar 2015).  
The trend of firms adopting dual-class share structures is not limited to minor or smaller 
enterprises. Several of the world’s most valuable and dynamic companies have gone public by 
offering shares with unequal voting rights in the U.S. Companies electing a dual-class structure of 
shares at their IPO include Alphabet (Google), Facebook, LinkedIn, Comcast, Zoetis, Nike, 
Alibaba, and Snap. Three of the top ten worldwide largest companies by market capitalization 
maintain equity structures with multiple classes of shares: Alphabet, Berkshire Hathaway, and 
Facebook (Sharfman 2017).  
The surge of firms that enable disproportionate insider control in the U.S. has triggered 
extensive discussions in the investing community.2 Dual-class share structures are controversial: 
disproportionate insider control has the potential to enable the expropriation of wealth by insiders 
at the expense of outside shareholders and to insulate under-performing management from 
shareholder accountability and the market for corporate control. Yet these equity structures also 
enable companies to focus on long-term strategy and better resist short-term expectations that often 
come with being publicly traded. 
Given the concern about weak corporate governance in this rapidly growing segment of 
U.S. public firms, our study is timely and important. How disproportionate insider control affects 
the demand for audit quality is not without ambiguity. On the one hand, entrenched insiders may 
 
2 See, for example, “Out of Control,” The Economist, September 22, 2014, available at 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21618889-more-worlds-big-stockmarkets-are-allowing-
firms-alibaba-sideline; “Why Investors Are Fretting Over Dual-Class Shares,” Bloomberg Businessweek, July 9, 2017, 
available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/why-investors-are-fretting-over-dual-class-
shares-quicktake-q-a. 
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use their dominant influence to hire lower quality auditors because they value their control over 
the company and wish to be unencumbered by strong outside monitoring. On the other hand, 
investors recognize that disproportionate control enhances insiders’ ability to influence financial 
reporting and to expropriate wealth at the expense of minority shareholders. Investors therefore 
discount the value of firms in which insiders can exert disproportionate control (e.g., Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, and Lang 2002; Harvey, Lins, and Roper 2004). Because inside shareholders bear 
a portion of the cost of evading efficient monitoring, contravening incentives also exist to reduce 
the price discount through self-bonding, i.e., enhanced external monitoring (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Our hand-collected data enable us to examine which one of these two possibilities is 
realized among dual-class firms in the U.S. capital market. 
We take a comprehensive look at the demand for audit quality in U.S. dual-class firms. 
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the probability that an auditor will both (1) discover a 
breach in the accounting system and (2) report the breach.3 As proxies for the auditor’s capability 
to discover a breach, we examine the client’s decisions to hire a Big 4 (Lennox 2005; Niskanen, 
Karjalainen, and Niskanen 2011) or industry specialist auditor (Kang 2014). Our proxies for the 
auditor’s propensity to report the breach, i.e., the auditor’s independence, are economic (fee) 
dependence (Li 2009; Hollingsworth and Li 2012) and the ratio of non-audit to audit fees (Niu 
2008).4 For consistency with prior studies, we also examine audit fees (Gotti et al. 2012; Mitra et 
al. 2007; Khalil et al. 2008).  
 
3 According to DeAngelo (1981), "the probability that a given auditor will discover a breach depends on the auditor's 
technological capabilities, the audit procedures employed on a given audit, the extent of sampling, etc. The conditional 
probability of reporting a discovered breach is a measure of an auditor's independence from a given client." 
4 Because our focus is on clients’ demand for audit quality, we study observable inputs to the audit process controlled 
by the client, instead of output-based measures, such as restatements or the issuance of going-concern opinions, which 
are best suited for tests examining auditors’ supply of audit quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014). 
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We conduct our analyses using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of U.S. dual-class 
firms in the 2000 to 2016 period.5 First, we examine results from within the sample of dual-class 
firms where we control for sample selection bias using the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation 
methodology, and for endogeneity using an instrumental variable approach. To corroborate these 
results, we also examine a sample of dual-class and propensity-score matched single-class firms 
(Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2009; Jordan, Liu, and Wu 2014; McGuire, Wang, and Wilson 2014).6  
We find that disproportionate insider control is associated with an increased probability to 
hire a Big 4 or industry specialist auditor, greater auditor independence (as indicated by a lower 
ratio of non-audit to audit fees and decreased fee dependence), as well as higher audit fees.7 These 
associations are consistent with an increased demand for audit quality by outside shareholders as 
well as a self-bonding explanation and identical incentives for insiders to reduce agency costs 
through enhanced monitoring.  
To validate our interpretation of these findings, we conduct a supplemental analysis and 
investigate whether and how audit quality affects the association of disproportionate insider 
control and firm value. As in prior work (Gompers et al. 2010, Baran and Forst 2015), we confirm 
a significant negative relationship between disproportionate control and firm value (Tobin’s Q), 
which is consistent with a valuation discount applied by investors who are concerned about poor 
corporate governance. Importantly we find a positive and significant interaction term of 
 
5 In all, our sample encompasses 4,748 firm-years from 641 non-financial dual-class firms in the 2000 to 2016 period. 
Upon merging with other necessary data from Compustat, CRSP, and AuditAnalytics, our final sample includes 499 
firms contributing 3,647 firm-years.  
6 Specifically, we follow Gompers et al. (2010) and estimate a probit model predicting whether a firm will adopt a 
dual-class structure or not. We then match each dual-class firm (without replacement) with a single-class firm with 
the closest predicted probability of choosing a dual-class structure. Using this procedure, we create a sample of firms 
that are similar with respect to characteristics affecting the election of a dual-class equity structure. 
7 These results conflict with Niu (2008), who finds a negative association of dual-class status with auditor 
independence. Moreover, while we confirm Khalil, Magnan, and Cohen’s (2008) finding of a positive association of 
disproportionate insider control and audit fees, our more comprehensive analysis of five proxies for audit quality 
suggests a demand- rather than a supply-based explanation. 
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disproportionate insider control and audit quality, indicating that audit quality significantly 
attenuates this negative association. Hence, consistent with a self-bonding explanation, and Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) conjecture that wealth effects provide incentives for insiders to self-bond 
through increased audit quality, our findings indicate that financial markets reward firms that are 
characterized by disproportionate insider control for higher audit quality.  
Insider ownership affords the potential to align the interests of shareholders and corporate 
insiders, but it also provides a means for entrenchment (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; 
Claessens et al. 2002). These two distinct consequences of insider ownership—incentives and 
entrenchment—are confounded in single-class firms, and must be identified using only one 
variable, insider stock ownership. A number of studies have therefore utilized firms with more 
than one class of common stock as a workaround, because in dual-class firms voting rights and 
cash flow rights held by insiders diverge (Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 2005; Masulis et al. 2009; 
Gompers et al. 2010).  
Consistent with the entrenchment effect of ownership, we find that in our dual-class firm 
sample voting rights held by insiders are associated with an increased probability to hire a Big 4 
or industry specialist auditor, greater auditor independence, and higher audit fees. Supporting the 
incentive-alignment effect of ownership, the association of these characteristics with insider cash 
flow rights is of the opposite sign. Taken together, these findings provide evidence that in dual-
class firms the effects of insider ownership on the demand for audit quality are non-linear: the 
incentive and entrenchment effects of ownership work in opposing directions. 
Overall our findings of a positive association of disproportionate insider control and the 
demand for audit quality are consistent with general agency-theoretical expectations which imply 
that outside shareholders will require enhanced external monitoring, and/or insiders will 
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voluntarily increase the observability of their actions to minimize the share of agency costs they 
bear (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The consistent positive association we find suggests that 
disproportionate insider control appears unlikely to compromise the rigor of the audit function. 
In Section 2, we discuss the related literature and develop our research expectations. We 
describe our sample, and present our research design and variable computation, in Section 3. 
Section 4 discusses our empirical results. Concluding remarks appear in Section 5.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH EXPECTATIONS 
Agency theory and the literature on managerial ownership and agency costs provide the 
theoretical underpinnings of this study. The agency conflict between owner-managers and outside 
shareholders derives from owner-managers’ propensity to appropriate perquisites out of firm 
resources for their own consumption when ownership and control diverge (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Among other mechanisms, effective third-party monitoring can substitute for the inability 
of outside shareholders to observe insiders’ actions directly. For this reason, prior work has 
identified the extent of agency conflicts as the principal determinant of a given client’s demand 
for audit quality (Watts 1977; DeAngelo 1981; Francis and Wilson 1988; DeFond 1992). 
Insider ownership reduces the agency conflict between corporate insiders and shareholders 
by aligning the interests of insiders with those of shareholders. To the extent that the incentive-
alignment effect of insider ownership mitigates the agency conflict, the need for external 
monitoring decreases. Entrenchment effects at higher levels of ownership, however, may offset 
positive incentive-alignment effects (Lennox 2005). While insider ownership therefore mitigates 
the classic Type I agency conflict between shareholders and managers of the firm, high levels of 
ownership can create a Type II agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, 
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where controlling shareholders may use their dominant position in the firm to extract private 
benefits at the cost of minority shareholders (Villalonga and Amit 2009).  
The potential for Type II agency problems appears particularly severe in dual-class firms. 
Unlike in firms with a single class of stock, where one share equals one vote, in dual-class firms 
corporate insiders typically control a portion of the vote that exceeds their economic interest. The 
decoupling of control and economic rights enables insiders to execute self-serving decisions at a 
lower cost.8 
Few studies examine how disproportionate insider control in dual-class firms affects audit 
characteristics. We are aware of two studies utilizing samples of Canadian firms. Niu (2008) finds 
a positive relation of dual-class status and non-audit fees, both in absolute terms and relative to 
audit fees, in a sample of Canadian firms in 2003 and 2004. Niu’s study indicates the possibility 
of lower auditor independence, which would be consistent with a lower demand for audit quality 
in firms characterized by disproportionate control.  
By contrast, in another study of Canadian firms in 2004, Khalil et al. (2008) document a 
positive association of disproportionate insider control and audit fees, which might indicate an 
increased demand for audit quality. Khalil et al. (2008), however, attribute their finding to auditors’ 
increased supply of, rather than clients’ increased demand for, audit quality. The two studies appear 
to conflict. Khalil et al.’s (2008) interpretation that audit firms supply higher audit quality is 
difficult to reconcile with Niu’s (2008) finding that these same audit firms are less independent.  
 
8 Specifically, in single-class firms the cost of misappropriation of corporate funds is proportionate to the insiders’ 
ownership stake. For instance, if insiders own 62% of the shares in a single-class firm, then 62% of the cost of a 
misappropriation of funds comes out of their own pockets. In the median dual-class firm in our sample, however, 
insiders command 62% of the firm’s voting rights, but only own 24% of its cash-flow rights. Therefore, at the expense 
of outside shareholders, the insiders’ cost of the consumption of private benefits is greatly reduced. 
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Two related studies investigate the demand for audit quality primarily among family firms, 
but in this context the researchers also examine separately family firms that maintain a dual-class 
structure of shares and those that do not.9 Ho and Kang (2013) find that family firms with and 
without dual-class shares pay lower audit fees and are less likely to hire a Big N auditor relative 
to the average non-family firm. Conversely, Kang (2014) shows that family firms with and without 
dual-class shares are more likely to appoint industry-specialist auditors than non-family firms do. 
The two studies do not appear to be internally consistent, as the finding that dual-class family firms 
have a negative (positive) association with Big N (industry specialist) auditor choice suggests a 
lower (higher) demand for audit quality reflecting decreased (increased) agency problems. Ho and 
Kang’s (2013) finding also conflicts with Khalil et al. (2008) who find higher audit fees for dual-
class firms in their Canadian study.  
Prima facie, two competing lines of argument exist with respect to the question of how 
disproportionate insider control affects the demand for audit quality. Because entrenched insiders 
likely value their control over the company, they may prefer less capable or less independent 
auditors who will provide lower levels of scrutiny. Moreover, their dominant position and 
enhanced voting power also puts insiders in a position to select an audit firm according to their 
preferences. By contrast, external shareholders have a strong interest in effective, high-quality, 
third-party monitoring because of an elevated risk of material misstatements and the possibility of 
misappropriation by corporate insiders through self-serving decisions. Their inferior voting power, 
however, may not enable external shareholders to influence the selection of the external auditor. 
 
9 Family firms and dual-class firms are distinct. Kang (2014) report that about 46% of members of the S&P 1500 
index in the 2000-2008 period are family-firms, whereas dual-class firms only comprised 8.7% of the Russell 3000 
index constituents in 2015 (Equilar 2015). In our sample, the original founder of the firm or his or descendants control 
25% or more of the voting power in 70.6% of our dual-class firms. Applying a more stringent definition of family 
controlled firms, we find that in 46.3% (52.5%) of dual-class firms founders or their descendants possess at least 25% 
of the voting power of the firm and serve as the CEO (or in any executive capacity).  
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In theory, reflecting the magnitude of the agency problem, and in lockstep with the 
magnitude of a real (or perceived) increase in the risk of fraud, material misstatements, and/or 
misappropriation from outside shareholders, investors should discount the value of shares of firms 
with disproportionate control rights (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Gompers et al. 2010). Consistent 
with this conjecture, empirical work has established a negative relationship between 
disproportionate insider control and firm value (Tobin’s Q) (Gompers et al. 2010; Baran and Forst 
2015). This decrease in firm value affects the wealth of inside and outside shareholders alike. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrate that insiders will therefore voluntarily submit to 
enhanced external monitoring, as long as the net increase in wealth generated from these self-
bonding activities exceeds the value of the perquisites that are relinquished. Entrenchment effects 
thus suggest a positive association between disproportionate insider control and the demand for 
audit quality, regardless of whether insiders of the corporation, external shareholders, or both 
ultimately select the auditor.  
Yet whether external auditors are truly in a position to protect outside investors from 
misappropriation by corporate insiders is not a foregone conclusion.10 External auditors cannot 
question whether specific business decisions are economically sound or in the best interest of 
outside shareholders. They can only provide assurance that financial statements are prepared in 
accordance with established accounting standards. However, there exist multiple mechanisms 
through which high quality audits of financial statements can at least partially protect outside 
shareholders from some forms of malfeasance in firms characterized by disproportionate insider 
control.  
 
10 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
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First and foremost, fraud is a particular concern in firms characterized by significant insider 
control. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) Interim Auditing Standard 
No. 316: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AU 316) lists incentives and 
pressures due to a significant financial interest in the firm as a risk factor for fraudulent financial 
reporting (AU §316.85). In addition, AU 316 notes that opportunities for fraud are heightened 
when management is dominated by a small group of persons, and effective internal controls hence 
may be lacking (AU §316.85). As opportunities and incentives for fraud increase, so does the 
demand for audit quality.  
Auditors limit insiders’ potential for opportunistic behavior also through the required 
disclosures for related party transactions and the assurance of effective internal controls. Beasley, 
Carcello, and Hermanson (2001) find that the failure to disclose related party transactions is among 
the top fraud-related audit deficiencies. By ensuring that financial relationships and material 
transactions between a tightly controlled company and its executive officers and directors are 
brought to the light of day, auditors protect outside shareholders while at the same time reducing 
the risk of fraud.11  
Consistent with Masulis et al. (2009), who demonstrate a positive association between 
disproportionate insider control and the extent of agency problems, and standard agency theory, 
which stipulates that both outside shareholders and corporate insiders have incentives to employ 
monitoring or self-bonding mechanisms to mitigate the extent of agency conflicts (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976), we expect an increase in clients’ demand for audit quality as disproportionate 
insider control increases. Accordingly, we hypothesize:  
 
11 While related party transactions have been contributing factors in numerous financial reporting frauds, continuing 
weaknesses in auditors' scrutiny of these areas exist to date, as noted by the PCAOB (AS 18, 2014). Related party 
disclosures therefore appear to be an area in which differential audit quality is relevant. 
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Hypothesis:  Disproportionate insider control is positively associated with clients’ demand for 
audit quality in that auditors engaged display  
a) an increased ability to discover a breach of the accounting system, and 
b) an increased probability to report the breach. 
3. SAMPLE, VARIABLE MEASUREMENT, AND RESEARCH DESIGN  
Sample 
We construct a new sample of non-financial U.S. dual-class firms from 2000 to 2016 
following the approach of Gompers et al. (2010). To this end, we first build a comprehensive list 
of firms that potentially issued more than one class of common stock by comparing the reported 
number of shares outstanding in CRSP and Compustat. We add firms to our list of potential dual-
class firms if any such difference exceeds 1% and identify additional possible dual-class firms 
from several other sources.12 For all dual-class firm candidates so identified, we use the Security 
and Exchange Commission's (SEC) EDGAR database to access proxy statements and/or 10-Ks to 
verify the corporate structure. Through these procedures, we are confident to present a sample that 
approaches the population of all public non-financial dual-class firms in the U.S. in this time 
period. Our dual-class sample comprises 641 firms, which provide 4,748 firm-years of data.  
Once the sample is identified, we determine insider ownership for each class of stock in 
every year.13 SEC reporting requirements mandate firms to disclose ownership for directors and 
 
12 Because the number of shares reported in CRSP is issue specific, whereas Compustat reports the total number of 
common shares outstanding regardless of class, any difference between the two numbers may indicate the existence 
of more than one class of shares. We identify as additional candidates any firm identified as dual-class firm from 
CRSP, Thomson SDC's Global New Issues database, RiskMetrics, and Jay Ritter's website, 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/dual-class-ipo.htm. Finally, we include as candidates all firms reported as dual-
class in the Gompers et al. (2010) sample, which spans 1995 to 2002. We thank Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew 
Metrick for generously sharing their data on dual-class companies. 
13 The SEC-required ownership disclosures include options and other rights to stock exercisable within 60 days of the 
disclosure date. To cleanly measure insider voting and cash flow rights, we screen the disclosures and compute 
ownership excluding all rights to shares. In all cases, we include shares regardless of disclaimers of ownership. 
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named executive officers, as well as for all directors and executive officers as a group. We define 
insider ownership comprehensively as this disclosed group of directors and officers (Gompers et 
al. 2010). Consistent with SEC disclosure requirements, we include in the number of shares held 
by insiders all shares owned by family members, or trusts for the benefit of family members, as 
well as shares owned by corporations with board representation. Upon merging our sample with 
AuditAnalytics for the audit related variables and with Compustat and CRSP to obtain necessary 
controls, our final sample consists of 3,647 firm-years (499 firms) with non-missing values for all 
variables needed in our analyses. 
Measuring Insider Voting and Cash Flow Rights 
We compute cash flow rights owned by insiders (CFR) as fractional equity ownership, i.e., 
the percentage of shares held by corporate insiders to shares outstanding of all classes, weighted 
by dividend rights per class (Gompers et al. 2010; Villalonga and Amit 2009). We define insider 
voting rights (VR) as the proportion of votes held by insiders to votes outstanding of all classes. 
Enhanced voting rights are typically accomplished by assigning a different number of votes per 
share to each class of stock, the most common ratio being 10:1. Alternatively, firms may establish 
disproportionate board representation rights for each class of shares, where each class of stock is 
entitled to elect a certain number of directors separately as a class (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985; 
Villalonga and Amit 2009). In these cases, we base our computation of voting rights on the voting 
power in the election of the board of directors.14 Our measure of disproportionate insider control 
is the difference between insider VR and CFR (WEDGE, Gompers et al. 2010). In single-class 
firms, the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights is zero by definition. 
 
14 For instance, assume the board has ten members. There are 20,000 Class A shares, all owned by insiders, which 
entitle their holders to elect six directors. There are also 100,000 Class B shares, which entitle their holders to elect 
the remaining four directors. If 10% of the Class B shares are owned by insiders, then the insider voting rights amount 
to 64%, because insiders can elect all six Class A directors plus 10% of the four Class B directors.  
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Empirical Models 
Audit characteristics are often determined by an interplay of supply and demand factors. 
Because we examine the client’s demand for audit quality, we focus on observable inputs to the 
audit process which are under the control of the client instead of output-based measures, such as 
restatements or the issuance of going-concern opinions, which are best suited for tests that examine 
the auditor’s supply of audit quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014). For instance, the choice of a BIG4 
or industry specialist auditor are more likely reflective of the client’s demand of audit quality, than 
of the auditor’s supply, because supplying increased audit quality by becoming a BIG4 or industry 
specialist auditor is not a feasible strategy for an audit firm, certainly in the short run and in 
response to a current audit engagement. Likewise, regarding our independence measure, the client 
is in control about the extent of non-audit services contracted from the auditor and hence the extent 
to which independence (or the appearance thereof) might be compromised through the provision 
of non-audit services by the external auditor.15 
We examine five proxies for clients’ demand for audit quality: two commonly used proxies 
for auditors’ ability to discover a breach in the accounting system (the propensity to hire a Big 4 
or industry specialist auditor); two proxies for auditors’ propensity to report the breach, i.e., auditor 
independence (the ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees and the auditor’s fee dependence); and audit 
 
15 Whether the provision of non-audit services negatively affects auditor independence or not, is probably not settled 
in the literature. On the one hand, the provision of non-audit services by external auditors has been of significant 
regulatory concern; on the other hand, empirical evidence has often been inconclusive. However, while it is not clear 
whether the provision of non-audit services actually impedes the external auditors’ independence, contracting 
significant non-audit services can negatively affect the appearance of independence (Dopuch, King, and Schwartz 
2003; Krishnan, Sami, and Zhang 2005). Accordingly, a demand for increased audit independence in the form of 
lowered utilization of the external auditor for non-audit services might be equally driven by a demand for improved 
audit quality as well as clients’ increased sensitivity for appearances and a desire to appear above reproach. 
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fees, which we include for consistency with a majority of empirical auditing studies.16A positive 
(or negative) association of disproportionate insider control and audit fees may be informative 
interpreted in the context of our findings for our other dependent variables. Because the audit fee, 
i.e., the price of the audit, is determined by both supply and demand factors, an examination of 
audit fees by itself may not be sufficient to distinguish between competing supply- and demand-
side arguments of audit quality.17 
We investigate the association of WEDGE and clients’ choice of a BIG4, SPECIALIST, or 
economically dependent (DEPEND) audit firm building on models from Godfrey and Hamilton 
(2005), Lennox (2005), and Kang (2014):  
CHOICEit =  β0 + β1WEDGEit + β2SIZEit +β3M_to_Bit + β4LEVERAGEit + β5ROAit + 
β6FOREIGNit + β7SEGMENTSit + β8LOSSit + β9MAit + β10LITRISKit + β11CAPINTit 
+ β12CATAit + β13Z_SCOREit + β14INVMILLSit + βjYEARit + βkINDUSTRYit + ε (1) 
In model (1), CHOICE represents the election of a Big 4, or industry specialist, audit firm. 
The binary dependent variable BIG4 equals one if the auditor is a Big 4 audit firm (Big 5 prior to 
2002), and zero otherwise. SPECIALIST represents an indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
has the largest market share in a Fama-French (1997) industry category and its market share is at 
least 10 percent greater than the next largest industry leader in both the national and regional 
 
16 DeAngelo (1981) highlights that audit firm size at the national level also enhances independence because larger 
firms are less likely to be economically beholden to any particular client. In this respect, Big 4 auditor choice may be 
ambiguous and reflect both, clients’ demand for auditors’ ability and auditors’ independence. However, economic 
dependence may be better captured at the local office level, because a single client can represent a large portion of 
office-level revenues, yet play an insignificant role at the national level (Li 2009). Accordingly, we believe that the 
choice of a Big 4, i.e., large national audit firm, per se is more reflective of a client’s demand for the auditors’ superior 
capabilities, rather than independence, which is predominately determined at the office level.  
17 From a demand perspective, the audit fees reflect the client’s demand for audit effort and quality. From an audit 
supply angle, disproportionate insider control may increase concerns about the probability of material misstatements. 
The increased audit risk and auditor business risk, which follows as a consequence could prompt auditors to increase 
their effort and/or to increase audit risk premia. Accordingly, it is questionable whether an analysis of audit fees can 
lend credence to either a supply or demand explanation, because the audit fee, i.e., the price of the audit, is a joint 
outcome of demand and supply. Auditors cannot charge for additional effort supplied unless there also exists a 
corresponding demand for the effort (DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
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market, and zero otherwise (Kang 2014).18 Fee dependence (DEPEND) is measured as the 
proportion of the client’s total fees paid to all fees from publicly traded clients for a given auditor 
office in the year.19 All other control variables are defined in Appendix A.  
We examine the association of WEDGE with the ratio of non-audit to audit fees, and audit 
fees based on Niu (2008), Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009), and Dao, Raghunandan, Rama (2012): 
FEESit = β0 + β1WEDGEit + β2SIZEit + β3M_to_Bit + β4LEVERAGEit + β5ROAit + 
β6FOREIGNit + β7SEGMENTSit + β8LOSSit + β9MAit + β10LITRISKit + β11CAPINTit 
+ β12CATAit + β13Z_SCOREit + β14NOT_UNQUALit + β15SPECIALISTit + β16BIG4it 
+ β17INVMILLSit + βjYEARit + βkINDUSTRYit + ε (2) 
FEES represent the ratio of non-audit to audit fees paid in a given year (NA/AUDFEES), or the 
natural log of audit fees (AUDFEES), respectively. Compared to model (1), model (2) includes the 
additional independent variables NOT_UNQUAL, SPECIALIST, and BIG4.  
Research Design 
Like any study of corporate governance characteristics, endogeneity concerns and sample 
selection bias may hamper the interpretation of our analyses. We address these concerns by 
conducting our analyses using two different samples. The first sample contains all dual-class firm-
year observations with a complete record of data (n = 3,647). Our second sample is a propensity 
score matched sample of dual-class and single-class firms (n = 6,320).20  
Because the decision to establish a dual-class structure is not random, results from a sample 
of only dual-class firms could be affected by self-selection bias. Specifically, it is possible dual-
 
18 We define the audit office’s regional market based on the Core-based Statistical Area (CBSA). If the audit firm’s 
ZIP code is not associated with a CBSA, we use the county as the relevant geographic area to define the audit market. 
19 Because our focus is on the client’s demand for audit quality, we use a continuous measure of fee dependence. This 
is more reasonable than a dichotomous variable in our context because a client likely is aware of its relative size in 
the local marketplace, and hence can approximate the economic significance it may have for a given audit firm. 
However, a client is unlikely to know its size as a specific percentage of the auditor's fee-base. In robustness tests, we 
alternatively employ a dichotomous measure of fee dependence based on a specific threshold proportion (10%) of 
client fees to total office fees. All results are comparable.  
20 Our sample size is smaller when DEPEND is the dependent variable, n = 2,973 in the dual-class firm sample and 
n = 5,200 in the matched sample because we require at least ten observations for the computation of fee dependence. 
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class firms are different from single-class firms with respect to characteristics other than dual-class 
status, and that such differences affect the association between disproportionate control and audit 
characteristics. We therefore control for possible sample selection effects by employing the 
Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation methodology. To this end, we estimate a probit model based 
on several proxies for the decision to establish a dual-class structure (Gompers et al. 2010):21  
Pr(DC) =  β0 + β1NAMEi + β2MEDIA_IPOi + β3SALESRANKi + β4PROFITRANKi + 
β5%FIRMSi + β6%SALESi + β7SALES/REGIONSALESi + β8STATELAWit + 
β9LISTINGYEARi + β10INDUSTRYi ε (3) 
Following Gompers et al. (2010) and McGuire et al. (2014), we use the coefficient 
estimates from model (3) to construct an inverse Mills ratio, which we include as an additional 
control for sample selection bias in all regressions using our sample of dual-class firms.22  
We also implement a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach because a firm’s ownership 
structure is endogenous. In the first stage, we regress WEDGE on a set of instrumental variables 
proposed by Gompers et al. (2010).23 We then re-estimate models (1) and (2) replacing WEDGE 
with the predicted value of WEDGE from this first stage regression. 
 
21 For brevity, we refer to Gompers et al. (2010) for the rationale of all variables included in model (3). For instance, 
NAME represents an indicator variable if the name of the company includes the name of person, and controls for the 
fact that family ownership is predictive of dual-class status (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985). We include all variables 
identified in Gompers et al. (2010). Because data to construct the state anti-takeover index (Gompers et al. 2003) are 
not available after 2006, we use the 2006 value for all more recent years. We did not observe a change in this variable 
for at least the last three years of available data. Including or excluding STATELAW does not affect results. 
22 We estimate model (3) using the universe of single- and dual-class firms for which variables for models (1) and (2) 
are available (n = 49,310) (McGuire et al. 2014). Dual-class firms comprise 7.4% of total observations (n = 3,647). 
We find that NAME, MEDIA_IPO, SALESRANK, and %SALES are positively and significantly associated with dual-
class choice, whereas %FIRMS displays a significant negative association. These results are consistent with Gompers 
et al. (2010), with the exception of SALESRANK for which Gompers et al. find a negative coefficient. We do not 
tabulate results from model (3) for parsimony. 
23 These variables are NAME, MEDIA_IPO, SALESRANK, PROFITRANK, %FIRMS, %SALES, 
SALES/REGIONSALES, and STATELAW from model (3) and all control variables from model (1). NAME, 
MEDIA_IPO, PROFITRANK, and %SALES are significantly associated with WEDGE and thus retained as instruments 
in the first stage along with controls (results available upon request). Instruments should not be significantly associated 
with the second stage dependent variable(s). When we test for overidentification, we find that all variables pass this 
test; i.e., are not associated with our audit quality measures.   
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Finally, to add further robustness, we also analyze a matched sample of dual- and single-
class firms, which we create following the propensity score matching (PSM) procedure outlined 
in Masulis et al. (2009) and McGuire et al. (2014). To this end, we derive probabilities that a firm 
will adopt a dual-class structure by re-estimating model (3). We then match (without replacement) 
dual- and single-class observations on the closest probability of choosing a dual-class structure.24 
This procedure creates a sample of firms with similar characteristics regarding dual-class choice, 
except that one firm has a dual-class structure while its matched peer does not.25 PSM hence creates 
a sample in which dual-class status is randomized across the treatment and control group 
(Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang 2011).26  
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, Panel A, reports descriptive statistics of several key characteristics of our dual-
class firm sample (n = 3,647 firm-years, 499 unique firms).27 The majority of dual-class firms in 
our sample have two classes of shares outstanding. Some firms maintain yet more complex capital 
structures; 6.2% of observations (226 firm-years) have more than two classes of common stock. 
In 80.3% of cases, one class has more votes in the election of directors than the other class(es). In 
 
24 We employ the Parsons (2001) greedy 5→1 digit matching algorithm and first match firms on five digits of the 
propensity score. Dual-class firms that do not match are next matched to single-class firms on four digits of the 
propensity score, and so on. We successfully match 86.6% of our dual-class firms. The remaining incomplete matching 
is due to disjointed ranges of propensity scores between dual- and single-class firms in a given year (Parsons 2001).  
25 We verify that, as expected, no significant difference exists between dual-class and matched single-class firms with 
respect to any of the variables included in the selection equation, for instance, the name variable, which proxies for 
family-firm status. 
26 PSM has been employed as a control for endogeneity (Masulis et al. 2009; McGuire et al. 2014), but the method 
can successfully adjust only for endogeneity due to observables (Tucker 2011). If the selection bias is due to 
unobservable characteristics that are omitted from the selection equation, PSM cannot correct for it. 
27 A majority of observations are from the Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, and Information Technology 
industries. Observations per year are relatively constant after a decline in firms following the dot com bubble. For 
2016, we do not have full data due to some yet missing records in Compustat at the time of this writing. A full break-
down of our sample by industry and year is available upon request.  
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addition, disproportionate board election rights are common; 1,113 observations (30.5% of 
sample) maintain an arrangement which entitles each class to elect a set number of directors.28 
While voting power differs substantially between classes of stock, dividends rights are largely 
identical and differ in only 10.9% of observations. We find that dual-class structures are 
overwhelmingly instituted to create a divergence between control and cash flow rights. In only 83 
observations (2.3% of sample) are differences between the classes of stock other than differences 
in voting or dividend rights.  
With respect to our variables of interest, firm insiders possess median (mean) voting rights 
of 62.0% (56.6%) compared to cash flow rights of 24.0% (28.9%). We measure disproportionate 
insider control, i.e., the extent of divergence of insider VR from CFR, as VR minus CFR, 
(WEDGE). The median (mean) of WEDGE is 28.4% (27.7%). Dual-class structures where insiders 
predominantly hold the inferior class of shares are rare. In only 167 observations (4.6% of sample) 
do we find that insider CFR exceed their VR.29  
We report mean and median values for our variables of interest and select control side-by-
side for our sample of dual-class and matched single-class firms in Table 1, Panel B (n= 3,160 
each). Paired t-tests indicate statistically significant univariate differences in means between dual- 
and matched single-class firm with respect to the choice of an industry specialist auditor, size, 
leverage, merger and acquisition activity, litigation risk, the current ratio, and the Altman z-score.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 
28 The percentage of firms with a different number of votes per class and the percentage of firms with disproportionate 
board representation rights exceeds 100% because a number of firms utilize both mechanisms. 
29 The existence of 2.3% dual-class firm observations in our sample with no difference in voting and cash-flow rights, 
in addition to 4.6% of observations where insiders hold the inferior shares, indicates the possibility of measurement 
error in studies that use a dichotomous variable of dual-class shares as an indicator for disproportionate insider control. 
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Regression Results 
Using our sample of dual-class firms, in which we control for sample-selection bias using 
the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation methodology, Table 2 displays the results of regressions 
of five proxies for clients’ demand for audit quality on disproportionate insider control, WEDGE 
and controls.  
With respect to the first part of our hypothesis, auditors’ ability to discover a breach in the 
accounting system, we find positive and significant associations of WEDGE and BIG4 and 
SPECIALIST (Columns A and B) indicate an increased demand for more capable auditors. 
Likewise, with respect to the second dimension of audit quality, auditor’s propensity to report a 
breach in the accounting system, we find statistically significant negative associations of WEDGE 
and DEPEND and NA/AUDFEES (Columns C and D). These associations are consistent with an 
increased demand for auditor independence. As disproportionate insider ownership increases, 
firms hire auditors that are less dependent on the client’s fees and provide fewer non-audit services 
relative to the amount of audit fees paid.30 As in Khalil et al. (2008), we also confirm a positive 
association between WEDGE and audit fees (t = 2.53, p < 0.05, two-tailed).  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Overall, we find strong support for our hypothesis. Disproportionate insider ownership is 
associated with an increased demand for both auditor capability and independence, consistent with 
a desire to assuage financial market concerns about weak corporate governance and/or counteract 
the perceived, or real, risk of increased material misstatements and misappropriation. We note that 
our finding of a negative association of WEDGE with NA/AUDFEES conflicts with Niu (2008), 
 
30 The audit environment changed substantially upon passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which in particular 
affected auditors’ ability to provide non-audit services to clients. To ensure that our results, especially for 
NA/AUDFEES, are not affected by the inclusion or omission of pre-/post-SOX observations in our data we include 
year fixed effects in all of our regressions.  
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who finds a positive association of dual-class status and NA/AUDFEES, indicating possible 
compromised auditor independence. Our finding of a negative ratio of non-audit to audit fees 
suggests lowered relative importance of non-audit services and thus increased auditor 
independence, consistent with our finding for DEPEND.31 
Table 3 reports results of a replication of this regression, using a 2SLS approach to control 
for endogeneity. We estimate WEDGE following Gompers et al. (2010) and replace observed 
WEDGE with its predicted value in models (1) and (2). As shown in Table 3, all results remain 
unaffected, except the association of WEDGE with NA/AUDFEES which remains negative, but 
loses statistical significance at conventional levels.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We report results of our replication of models (1) and (2) using a propensity score matched 
sample of dual- and single-class firms in Table 4. All results for the effects of WEDGE on audit or 
auditor characteristics are consistent with those reported in Tables 3 and 4 for the dual-class firm 
sample. As disproportionate insider control increases, we find a greater likelihood to hire a Big 4 
or industry specialist auditor, lowered economic dependence of the audit firm, a lowered ratio of 
non-audit to audit fees, and higher audit fees. All of these association are statistically significant, 
including the association of WEDGE with NA/AUDFEES, except for the association with BIG4 in 
this specification. 
[Insert Table 4 about here]  
 
31 We also examine the absolute amount of non-audit fees and find consistent results, i.e., a statistically significant 
negative association of WEDGE and non-audit fees, which is also contradictory to Niu (2008), who finds lowered 
non-audit fees in absolute amount. Taken together, our results for non-audit fees are consistent with a sensitivity of 
firms that are characterized by disproportionate insider control to the appearance of compromised independence due 
to the contracting of substantial non-audit work with their audit firm. 
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Results reported in Tables 2 through 4 provide evidence confirming our hypothesis. We 
find a positive association of disproportionate insider control and clients’ demand for audit quality, 
reflected in both an increased demand for auditors’ capability as well as auditors’ independence. 
These results are consistent across our dual-class and matched dual- and single-class firm samples, 
the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation methodology to correct for sample selection bias, and 
an instrumental variable approach to control for endogeneity. The robust positive association we 
find is consistent both with outside shareholders’ increased demand for external monitoring, as 
well as self-bonding by entrenched insiders. In particular, the finding that firms characterized by 
disproportionate control display a lowered reliance on their auditors for the provision of non-audit 
services suggests a concern for appearances and an interest in signaling high integrity. 
The positive association with the demand for audit quality we find complements Dey, 
Nikolaev, and Wang (2015), who document increased monitoring by debtholders in firms 
characterized by disproportionate insider control. Higher audit quality also corroborates Nguyen 
and Xu’s (2010) and Chen’s (2008) finding of lowered earnings management activities in firms 
with disproportionate insider control. Our results suggest that earnings management may not only 
be less prevalent among such firms due to lowered incentives or decreased market pressure for 
earnings management, as Nguyen and Xu (2010) or Chen (2008) suggest, but could also be due to 
enhanced auditor monitoring. 
Extended Analysis: Disproportionate Control, Audit Quality, and Firm Value 
We find consistent evidence of a positive association of disproportionate insider control 
and audit quality across a set of proxies for auditor capability as well as auditor independence. 
However, as much as Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrate that inside shareholders have 
incentives identical to those of outside shareholders to minimize agency costs through self-bonding 
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activities, these findings still appear to go against the grain; the counter-argument that entrenched 
insiders may act exactly to the opposite, i.e., appoint weak auditors to further their entrenchment, 
is compelling. Accordingly, to corroborate a possible self-bonding explanation, we examine 
whether increased external monitoring in the form of enhanced audit quality indeed decreases the 
disproportionate control valuation penalty imposed by investors.  
To this end, we replicate the primary results in Gompers et al. (2010) who establish a 
negative association of firm value (Tobin’s Q) and disproportionate insider control. To this model, 
we add an interaction term of WEDGE and a composite measure of audit quality (AUDQUAL):  
Tobin’s Q = β0 + β1WEDGEit + β2WEDGE*AUDQUAL it + β3 AUDQUAL it + β4ATit+ 
β5LEVERAGEit + β6NEGEQUITYit + β7ROAit + β8R&Dit + β9CAPEXit + 
β10ADVERTISINGit +β11DIVit + β12ACQit + β13FIRMAGEit + β14SP500it + βkYEAR 
+ βlINDUSTRY + ε (4) 
Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to their replacement cost. We examine Tobin’s 
Q as well as the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. Our composite measure of audit quality, 
AUDQUAL, is the principal factor of a confirmatory factor analysis of our five proxies for audit 
quality. Control variables included in model (4) are largely drawn from Gompers et al. (2010); 
variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Results are summarized in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
First, consistent with prior work, we find a significant negative association of 
disproportionate insider control and firm value, indicating that due to concerns about 
misappropriation, weak corporate governance, an increased risk of material misstatements, or low 
reputation, investors discount the value of shares of firms characterized by disproportionate insider 
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control. Second, crucially, the interaction of disproportionate control and audit quality, 
WEDGE*AUDQUAL, is positive, in support of our expectation.32  
The positive and significant interaction of WEDGE*AUDQUAL indicates that the 
appointment of higher quality auditors mitigates the negative effect of disproportionate insider 
control on firm value. This finding lends credence to the signaling, or self-bonding, explanation 
for our results. Investors value high audit quality in firms characterized by disproportionate insider 
control and reduce their valuation penalty. Insiders, who bear a significant portion of the value 
discount imposed by investors, accordingly have strong economic incentives to self-bond through 
increased audit quality (Jensen and Meckling 1976).33 
Extended Analysis: Differential Effects of Voting and Cash Flow Rights  
Prior work establishes that firm value is related to insider ownership in a non-linear 
fashion: the association is positive at low levels of ownership, but turns negative as insider 
ownership increases (Morck et al. 1988; McConnell and Servaes 1990). The non-linear association 
of insider ownership and firm value is consistent with the notion that ownership conveys both a 
positive incentive-alignment effect as well as an opportunistic entrenchment effect. It is 
challenging for the empirical researcher to disentangle the two distinct consequences of insider 
ownership—incentives and entrenchment— in singe-class firms, because they are confounded, 
and must be identified from only one variable: insider stock ownership. 
 
32 We also examine cost of capital as an alternate metric to Tobin’s Q to demonstrate the economic incentives to self-
bond through higher quality audits. We find consistent results, i.e., WEDGE is associated with higher cost of capital, 
and the interaction term of WEDGE*AUDQUAL, is negative, indicating that increasing audit quality reduces the 
negative impact of disproportionate insider control on the firm’s cost of capital. However, while consistent, these 
relationships are not statistically significant. We thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to also examine cost 
of capital. 
33 For instance, in our sample, insiders own on average 77.8% (14.5%) of shares outstanding of the superior (inferior) 
class. 
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Our special setting of dual-class firms also allows us to separately assess the impact of 
incentive-alignment and entrenchment effects of ownership on the demand for audit quality. Table 
6 displays the results of regressions of five proxies for clients’ demand for audit quality on insider 
voting (VR) and cash flow rights (CFR) and controls. Reflecting the entrenchment (incentive-
alignment) effects of ownership, we expect voting rights (cash flow rights) held by insiders to 
increase (decrease) the extent of agency problems, and hence the demand for audit quality.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
With respect to auditors’ ability to discover a breach in the accounting system, we find 
positive (negative) associations of VR (CFR) and BIG4 and SPECIALIST (Columns A and B). 
These findings indicate an increased demand for more capable auditors as insider voting rights 
increase, consistent with entrenchment effects of insider ownership. Insider cash flow rights, which 
proxy for the incentive-alignment effect of ownership, display an opposite association. Likewise, 
with respect to the second dimension of audit quality, auditor independence, we find negative 
(positive) associations of VR (CFR) and DEPEND and NA/AUDFEES (Columns C and D), which 
indicate a corresponding increased (decreased) demand for auditor’s propensity to report a breach 
in the accounting system. The association of VR (CFR) and AUDFEES is positive (negative) 
(Column E), further corroborating our findings that incentive-alignment and entrenchment effects 
of ownership work in opposite directions. All of these associations are statistically significant 
except for those between CFR and BIG4 and DEPEND.  
These additional results provide evidence from our dual-class firm sample that the 
incentive-alignment and entrenchment effects of insider ownership indeed exhibit two distinct and 
separate effects on clients’ demand for audit quality (Lennox 2005). We find a positive (negative) 
association of insider voting rights (insider cash flow rights) with our various proxies for the 
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demand for audit quality. These findings are consistent with agency theory, which suggests that 
entrenchment (incentive-alignment) effects of insider ownership will increase (decrease) clients’ 
demand for audit quality. 
Extended Analysis: Moderating Factors 
The positive association between disproportionate control and the demand for audit quality 
we find may not be constant across all types of firms. We examine three possible factors that may 
moderate the association between WEDGE and our measures of audit quality: riskiness, size, and 
board monitoring strength. To this end, we include in models (1) and (2) interaction terms of 
WEDGE with return volatility (RET_VOL), SIZE, and the proportion of independent directors 
serving on the board of directors (NUM_IND).  
While the relative riskiness of the firm arguably affects the demand for audit quality, we 
do not discern a significant interaction effect of WEDGE*RET_VOL with any of our five 
dependent variables. Similarly, we did not pick up a significant interaction of WEDGE*NUM_IND 
for any of our dependent variables, except for industry specialist auditor choice. In this case the 
interaction term indicates that weaker boards are more likely to hire specialist auditors, consistent 
with expectations. 
We discern significant interactions of WEDGE*SIZE in our regressions of SPECIALIST, 
DEPEND, and NA/AUDFEES in the direction of smaller firms having a yet higher demand for 
audit quality compared to larger firms. This finding is possibly surprising because typically larger 
firms are more in the spotlight and hence considered to bear a higher reputational risk. On the other 
hand, exactly because smaller firms can more easily go under the radar, and hence arguably carry 
an increased risk of material misstatements and misappropriations, they may have stronger 
incentives for higher audit quality. Our findings are consistent with the latter explanation. 
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Robustness Tests 
To further mitigate endogeneity concerns, we conduct a number of additional tests. Our 
primary control for endogeneity in the form of a correlated omitted variable bias is our 2SLS 
approach, reported in Table 3 and accompanying text. In addition, we test the robustness of our 
results to the inclusion of a number additional control variables in models (1) and (2).  
One such possible omitted variable is the availability of private benefits of control. Insiders 
interested in extracting benefits of control may have incentives to establish weaker audits when 
more opportunities to extract perquisites exist. At the same time, insiders of firms with a higher 
capacity for private benefits are more likely to establish a dual-class structure that enables the 
extraction of private benefits while avoiding the pro-rata consequences of self-serving decisions. 
Following Masulis et al. (2009), we therefore control for existent opportunities for private benefits 
of control by including the variables predicting dual-class status from model (3) directly in our 
models (1) and (2).  
We also test the robustness of our results to the influence of governance characteristics. 
Specifically, we include hand-collected control variables for board size, the percentage of 
independent directors serving on the board, and CEO-Chairman identity. We also include a hand-
collected additional control for family firm status. The indicator variable FAMILY equals one if 
the founder(s) or their descendants possesses more than 25% of the voting power, and zero 
otherwise.34 We further include four additional controls for accounting quality and the associated 
audit risk: Performance-matched discretionary accruals (DAQ) (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 
 
34 Our primary control for family firm status our matched sample analysis, where we match dual- and single class 
firms on a proxy for family firm status among other characteristics. 
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2005); return volatility (RET_VOL);35 an indicator variable for small positive earnings (SPOS) 
(Lang, Raedy, and Yetman 2003; Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008); and, finally, an indicator 
variable for restatements (RESTATE). Results reported in Table 7 indicate that the inclusion of 
these additional controls does not affect our results.36  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
With respect to Big 4 auditor choice, Lawrence et al. (2011) suggest that the selection of a 
Big 4 auditor is explained by client characteristics, and in particular client size. Whether propensity 
score matching on client characteristics truly eliminates any Big 4 effect, or whether Lawrence et 
al.’s (2011) findings are due to design choices and a Big 4 effect indeed does persist, as argued by 
DeFond, Erkens, and Zhang (2016), will likely remain an unsettled question for some time. Given 
this current controversy surrounding the validity of Big 4 auditor choice as a proxy for audit 
quality, we conduct an additional robustness test, where we match a dual-class firm that chose a 
non-Big 4 audit firm with the dual-class firm closest in size that chose a Big 4 firm. In this size-
matched sample, we successfully eliminate difference in firm size between dual-class firms that 
selected Big 4 auditors and those that did not at the univariate level. Results of a regression of 
model (1) using this sample are similar to those reported in Table 2, Column A. Disproportionate 
insider control, WEDGE, continues to be positively, and significantly, associated with engaging a 
Big 4 auditor (p < .05).37 
 
35 We report results using daily stock returns volatility measured over the prior year. We alternatively compute return 
volatility as the monthly stock return volatility over the prior sixty-month period. Likewise, we alternatively employ 
discretionary accruals derived from the modified Jones model.  
36 We do not include these variables in our main results because they are largely not significant in the presence of 
other controls in our model but do reduce our sample size. For brevity, we tabulate results when jointly including all 
additional control variables in our regression. Results are not affected when including the additional control variables 
one at a time. 
37 We thank the editor for suggesting this test. Results available upon request. 
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To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the specific constructions of our dependent 
variables, we examine alternate definitions for audit firm industry specialization and 
independence. As an alternate specification of industry specialization, we define an industry 
specialist as one that maintains a national market share greater than 25% (30%) from 2000 to 2002 
(2003 to 2016) and a city market share greater than 50% (Neal and Riley 2004; Kang 2014); results 
are qualitatively similar. We also test a dichotomous measure of economic dependence, and define 
an economically dependent auditor as one that obtains more 10% of its revenue from the client. 
Results using this alternate specification of economic dependence are nearly identical to our 
tabulated results. Finally, when using the ratio of non-audit to total fees, instead of the ratio of non-
audit to audit fees, the coefficient on WEDGE continues to be negative, but is slightly weaker (p 
= 0.11, one-tailed).38  
We also employ a number of alternate specifications for our control variables. We 
alternatively control for segments using the total number of segments (business, operating, and 
geographic) instead of the number of business segments only; define firm size alternatively as the 
natural logarithm of total assets; and compute LEVERAGE as total debt to total assets (instead of 
total liabilities to total assets). None of these choices alter our results. Likewise, all results, 
including the results for the industry specialist model, are robust to using Fama-French (1997) 
industries, instead of GICS industries, for defining industry specialization and as industry controls.  
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
We examine the relationship between disproportionate insider control in dual-class firms 
and the demand for audit quality. Because a dual-class structure of equity enables insiders to exert 
 
38 We surmise offsets are the main reason for weakened results when using total fees in the denominator, because 
the higher audit fees and lower non-audit fees we find among dual-class firms cancel out when added together. 
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disproportionate influence in the corporation, concern exists as to the monitoring ability of outside 
shareholders and/or the monitoring effectiveness of the board of directors (Baran and Forst 2015). 
For instance, in the context of Facebook’s 2012 IPO, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS 2012) 
warned of the “autocratic model of governance” in dual-class firms that may be less viable than 
companies in which all shareholders have proportional rights. Despite concerns about weak 
corporate governance, dual-class firms have grown rapidly in the U.S. capital market in recent 
years. In 2015, almost a quarter of all firms going public in the U.S. went public with a dual-class 
structure of shares.39 In, 2005, the proportion was 1% (Feldman 2016). 
Prior empirical work on how disproportionate insider control affects the demand for audit 
quality has been limited, and at times contradictory (Niu 2008; Khalil et al. 2008). Using a 
comprehensive, hand-collected sample of U.S. dual-class firms from 2000 to 2016, we examine 
both components of DeAngelo’s (1981) definition of audit quality, i.e., the probabilities that the 
auditor will (1) discover a breach in the accounting system and (2) report the breach, and use 
multiple measures for each component.  
We find that disproportionate insider control is positively associated with audit fees, the 
likelihood of hiring a Big 4 or specialist auditor, and auditor independence (measured as fee 
dependence and the ratio of non-audit to audit fees). These findings reflect an increased demand 
for audit quality in the form of an increased demand for auditor capability, as well as an increased 
demand for auditor independence. Both are consistent with a desire to use enhanced external 
monitoring as a self-bonding mechanism (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Indeed, in extended 
analyses we find that audit quality alleviates the negative effect of disproportionate insider control 
 
39 Picking up on the sharply increasing trend of U.S, dual-class IPOs, and concerned about a loss of market share, the 
Hong Kong and Singapore stock exchanges are currently considering lifting their prohibition of dual-class stock 
listings, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2017/02/18/2003665180. 
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on firm value, which gives credence to self-bonding as an economically important explanation for 
the positive association between disproportionate control and audit quality we observe.  
In extended analyses, we also examine the association of the distinct incentive-alignment 
effect and entrenchment effect with the demand for audit quality. We find that voting rights, which 
proxy for the entrenchment effect of ownership, are associated with higher audit fees, a higher 
likelihood to engage a Big 4 or specialist auditor, and increased auditor independence. Conversely, 
we find that cash flow rights owned by insiders, a proxy for the incentive-alignment effects of 
ownership, display associations in the opposite direction: lowered audit fees, a lower propensity 
to hire a Big 4 or industry specialist auditor, and decreased auditor independence. These findings 
from dual-class firms validate the conjectures in Lennox (2005), Niskanen et al. (2011), and Gotti 
et al. (2012), who predict a non-linear association of insider ownership with audit quality due to 
the contravening entrenchment and incentive-alignment effects of ownership.  
In a recent development, citing a concern for shareholder rights in dual-class firms, index 
firms FTSE Russell declared that it will exclude companies with low, or no, voting rights from its 
indices. In turn, S&P Dow Jones announced to exclude all companies with multiple-class share 
structures from inclusion in the S&P Composite 1500 and component indices, including its 
flagship S&P 500. S&P Dow Jones’s decision however will not apply to its existing index 
constituents.40  
We see the two index makers’ 2016 decision as evidence for an intensifying battle about 
inferior governance and shareholder rights in firms that enable disproportionate insider control. 
Whether and how these changes will affect new public companies’ decision to adopt dual-class 
 
40 FTSE Russell’s decision leaves latitude for issuers to implement share classes with differential voting rights, as long 
the voting power of outside shareholders meets a 5% minimum threshold. S&P Dow Jones’ policy to exclude all new 
companies with multiple-class share structures from its key indices is much broader. 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/05/sp-and-ftse-russell-on-exclusion-of-companies-with-multi-class-shares/.  
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structures remains to be seen. Our findings of enhanced audit quality in firms with disproportionate 
insider control fit in the context of these developments. Firms under attack for weak governance 
and inferior shareholder rights certainly have strong incentives to put investors’ concerns at ease 
through increased audit quality. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
 
ACQ Cash value of acquisitions scaled by total assets.  
ADVERTISING Ratio of advertising expense to total assets.  
AUDQUAL Audit quality calculated as the principal factor value from a factor analysis of 
our five proxies of demand for audit quality: BIG4, SPECIALIST, DEPEND, 
AUDFEES, NA/AUDFEES.  
AT Natural log of total assets. 
AUDFEES Natural log of audit fees. 
BIG4 An indicator variable that equals one if the auditor is a Big 4 audit firm (Big 5 
prior to 2002), and zero otherwise. 
BSIZE Board of director size. 
CAPEX Ratio of capital expenditures to total assets.  
CAPINT  Ratio of gross property, plant, and equipment to total revenues. 
CATA Ratio of current assets to total assets.  
CEO_IS_CHAIR Indicator variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if the CEO is also chairman of 
the board of directors.  
CFR Insider cash flow rights defined as the proportion of cash flow rights owned by 
insiders to the total cash flow rights of the firm. 
DAQ Performance-matched discretionary accrual quality derived from the modified 
Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005)  
DC Indicator variable equal to one for dual-class firms and zero for single-class 
firms. 
DEPEND Fee dependence defined as the ratio of total client fees to all fees from publicly 
traded clients for a given auditor office in the year, requiring at least ten fee 
observations.  
DIV Cash value of dividends paid scaled by common equity.  
FAMILY Indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the firm founder or family members 
control more than 25% of voting rights. 
FIRMAGE Natural log of firm age. 
FOREIGN Indicator variable that equals one if foreign income is reported, and zero 
otherwise.  
INDUSTRY Industry fixed effects, based on GICS industries. 
INVMILLS The inverse Mills ratio derived from model (3) and included as a control for 
sample selection bias. 
LEVERAGE Ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
LISTINGYEAR Indicator variables for the year of first appearance in CRSP 
LITRISK Indicator variable that takes a value of one (and zero otherwise) if the firm is 
subject to high litigation risk. High litigation risk firms are SIC codes 2800-
2899, 3500-3699, 3800-3899, or 7300-7399 (Gul, Jaggi, and Krishnan 2007). 
LOSS Indicator variable that equals one if net income is negative, and zero otherwise. 
MA Indicator variable that takes a value of one (and zero otherwise) if the firm 
engages in merger and acquisition activity in a given year.  
MEDIA Indicator variable equal to one if the firm operated in the media industry, zero 
otherwise. Media industries are SIC codes 2710-2711, 2720-2721, 2730-2731, 
4830, 4832-4833, 4840-4841, 7810, 7812, and 7820 (Gompers et al. 2010). 
MEDIA_IPO Indicator variable equal to one if a firm is a member of a media industry as 
defined at IPO per Gompers et al. (2010), zero otherwise. 
M_to_B Ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity.  
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NA/AUDFEES Ratio of non-audit to audit fees. 
NAME Indicator variable equal to one if the company name contains a person’s name 
at IPO, and zero otherwise.41 
NEGEQUITY Indicator variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if a firm has negative equity. 
NOT_UNQUAL Indicator variable that equals one if the audit opinion is other than unqualified 
without additional language, and zero otherwise. 
NUM_IND Proportion of independent directors on the board of directors.  
PROFITRANK 
 
RESTATE 
The percentile ranking of the firm’s profitability in the year of its IPO relative 
to firms with the same IPO year. 
Indicator variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if financial statements have 
been restated.  
RET_VOL Standard deviation of the prior year daily stock returns. 
ROA Ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. 
R&D Research and development expense scaled by total assets.  
SALES/REGIONSALES The percentage of the firm’s sales relative to the sales of all firms in the same 
CBSA in the year of its IPO. 
SALESGR Annual sales growth. 
SALESRANK The percentile ranking of the firm’s sales in the year of its IPO relative to firms 
with the same IPO year. 
SEGMENTS Number of business segments 
SIZE Natural log of market value of equity. 
SP500 Indicator variable for S&P 500 inclusion. 
SPECIALIST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPOS 
An indicator variable which equals one if the audit firm is an industry 
specialist, based on whether the firm has the largest market share in a GICS 
industry category and its market share is at least 10 percent greater than the 
next largest industry leader in both the national and regional market, and zero 
otherwise (Kang 2014). We define the audit office’s regional market based on 
the Core-based Statistical Area (CBSA). If the audit firm’s ZIP code is not 
associated with a CBSA, we use the county as the relevant geographic area to 
define the audit market. 
Indicator variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if net income scaled by total 
assets is between 0.00 and 0.01 (Lang et al. 2003; Barth et al. 2008). 
STATELAW An index of state takeover laws defined in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
from the firm’s state of incorporation in the previous year. 
TOBIN’S Q Tobin’s Q, defined as (Book Value of Assets + Market Value of Equity – 
Book Value of Equity – Deferred Taxes)/Book Value of Assets.  
VR Insider voting rights defined as the proportion of votes held by insiders to the 
total existing voting rights in a given firm. 
WEDGE The difference between insider voting rights and cash flow rights. WEDGE 
equals zero for single-class firms by definition. 
YEAR  Year fixed effects. 
Z_SCORE The Altman Z-score. 
%FIRMS The percentage of all firms located in the firm’s CBSA in the year prior to the 
firm’s IPO 
%SALES  The percentage of all sales generated in the firm’s CBSA in the year prior to 
the firm’s IPO.  
 
41 We thank Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick for providing the name indicator variable for the universe 
of firms in Gompers et al. (2010). For firms not included in their study, we follow the same procedure used in Gompers 
et al. (2010) to identify the presence of a family name in the firm name.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Dual-Class Firm Characteristics and Key Variables 
 
Panel A: Select characteristics of dual-class firm sample and variables of interest, n = 3,647 
 Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
 
    More than two classes of shares 0.062 0.240 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    Unequal number of votes per class 0.970 0.170 1.000 1.000 1.000 
    Disproportionate board representation 0.305 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000 
    Unequal dividends per class 0.109 0.311 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    Equal voting and dividend rights 0.023 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    Negative divergence: CFR exceed VR 0.046 0.209 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    VR 0.566 0.265 0.375 0.620 0.760 
    CFR 0.289 0.211 0.121 0.240 0.427 
    WEDGE 0.277 0.196 0.130 0.284 0.411 
 
Panel B: Dependent and control variables in matched dual- and single-class firm sample, n = 6,320 
 Dual (n = 3,160) Single (n = 3,160)   
Dependent variables Mean Median Mean Median t-stat.  
    BIG4  0.822 1.000 0.813 1.000 0.98  
    SPECIALIST 0.091 0.000 0.079 0.000 1.67 c 
    DEPEND 0.043 0.019 0.046 0.021 -1.63  
    NA/AUD_FEES 0.567 0.213 0.544 0.212 0.56  
    AUDFEES 13.622 13.626 13.584 13.639 1.24  
Control variables       
    SIZE 6.281 6.297 6.168 6.284 2.15 b 
    M_to_B 2.221 1.653 5.432 1.965 -1.40  
    LEVERAGE 0.524 0.494 0.557 0.535 -4.26 a 
    ROA -0.016 0.031 -0.027 0.036 0.86  
    FOREIGN 0.268 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.74  
    SEGMENTS 2.389 2.000 2.308 1.000 1.62  
    LOSS 0.290 0.000 0.297 0.000 -0.66  
    MA 0.132 0.000 0.163 0.000 -3.48 a 
    LITRISK 0.293 0.000 0.359 0.000 -5.59 a 
    CAPINT 2.530 0.425 1.208 0.366 1.07  
    CATA 0.458 0.460 0.469 0.464 -1.87 c 
    Z_SCORE -1.265 -1.578 -1.016 -1.364 -2.71 a 
    NOT_UNQUAL 0.352 0.000 0.350 0.000 0.16  
This study uses a hand-collected sample of 3,647 dual-class firm-year observations (499 unique firms) between 2000 and 
2016 for which matching data are available in the Compustat, CRSP, and AuditAnalytics databases. VR are voting rights 
defined as the proportion of voting rights held by insiders; CFR is the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. 
WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the difference VR and CFR. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2  
Dual-Class Sample: Effects of Disproportionate Insider Control on Clients’ Demand for Audit Quality 
 
 Column A 
 
Column B 
 
Column C 
 
Column D  Column E  
Dependent Variable: BIG4  SPECIALIST  DEPEND  NA/AUDFEES  AUDFEES  
 
Coeff. 
est. 
Wald 
χ2 stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
Wald 
χ2 stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 
                
    WEDGE 0.516 6.74 a 0.454 5.85 b -0.041 -2.39 b -0.497 -2.00 b 0.322 2.53 b 
Controls                
    SIZE 0.494 327.89 a 0.084 14.97 a 0.012 5.27 a 0.150 5.41 a 0.369 21.00 a 
    M_to_B -0.001 0.07  -0.002 0.82  0.001 0.11  0.001 1.31  -0.001 -1.20  
    LEVERAGE 0.864 6.91 a 0.459 2.04  0.041 3.16 a -0.136 -0.90  1.088 6.43 a 
    ROA -1.989 20.50 a -0.518 1.95  -0.013 -1.12  0.243 1.31  -0.623 -3.88 a 
    FOREIGN 0.315 12.65 a 0.026 0.09  0.007 0.99  -0.088 -0.95  0.308 5.96 a 
    SEG -0.008 0.19  0.030 3.66 c 0.002 1.04  0.006 0.21  0.053 5.02 a 
    LOSS -0.090 0.93  -0.019 0.04  0.008 1.88 c 0.103 1.55  0.174 4.30 a 
    MA 0.001 0.00  -0.210 3.33 c 0.007 1.42  -0.077 -1.71 c 0.114 2.88 a 
    LITRISK 0.273 5.73 b -0.462 9.84 a -0.004 -0.54  -0.134 -0.96  0.151 1.98 b 
    CAPINT -0.050 3.14 c -0.085 3.74 c 0.002 2.58 b -0.017 -0.73  -0.035 -2.39 b 
    CATA    -0.262 1.67  -0.260 1.44  -0.009 -0.67  0.027 0.14  -0.196 -1.36  
    Z_SCORE -0.041 0.76  -0.016 0.11  -0.002 -2.35 b 0.017 0.90  -0.052 -2.58 a 
    NOT_UNQUAL 
 
  
 
     0.041 0.57  0.152 5.00 a 
    SPECIALIST          0.284 1.87 c 0.139 2.29 b 
    BIG4          -0.237 -1.66 c 0.308 4.63 a 
    INVMILLS -0.382 12.33 a 0.113 0.93  -0.003 -0.35 
 
-0.075 -0.86  -0.157 -1.94 c 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo-R2  0.534 
 
 0.217 
 
 0.193 
 
 0.138   0.776  
N  3,647 
 
 3,647 
 
 2,973 
 
 3,647   3,647  
WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the difference between VR, the proportion of voting rights 
held by insiders, and CFR, the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include 
an intercept, as well as year and industry indicator variables. Columns A and B report probit regressions; Columns C through E report regressions 
where test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests).  
 
  
40 
 
Table 3 
Dual-Class Sample (2SLS): Effects of Disproportionate Insider Control on Clients’ Demand for Audit Quality 
 
 Column A 
 
Column B 
 
Column C 
 
Column D  Column E  
Dependent Variable: BIG4  SPECIALIST  DEPEND  NA/AUDFEES  AUDFEES  
 
Coeff. 
est. 
Wald 
χ2 stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
Wald 
χ2 stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 
                
    WEDGE 3.75 9.44 a 3.236 8.207 a -0.501 -6.68 a -0.808 -0.90  2.812 3.06 a 
Controls                
    SIZE 0.491 318.96 a 0.075 11.59 a 0.012 5.21 a 0.153 5.32 a 0.360 20.73 a 
    M_to_B 0.001 0.02  -0.001 0.29  0.001 1.68 c 0.001 0.93  0.001 0.25  
    LEVERAGE 1.026 9.31 a 0.644 3.93 b 0.006 0.46  -0.151 -0.99  1.218 7.59 a 
    ROA -2.176 23.66 a -0.679 3.28 c 0.018 1.36  0.258 1.40  -0.771 -4.64 a 
    FOREIGN 0.303 11.51 a 0.008 0.01  0.008 1.27  -0.083 -1.67 c 0.277 5.35 a 
    SEG -0.025 1.64  0.013 0.56  0.004 2.25 b 0.007 0.26  0.040 3.23 a 
    LOSS -0.069 0.55  -0.007 0.01  -0.001 -0.33  0.101 1.48  0.183 4.54 a 
    MA 0.063 0.28  -0.167 2.05  -0.004 -0.84  -0.082 -1.67 c 0.156 3.70 a 
    LITRISK 0.320 7.48 a -0.434 8.83 a -0.017 -2.18 b -0.142 -1.02  0.213 2.75 a 
    CAPINT -0.052 3.37 c -0.080 3.44 c 0.002 3.31 a -0.018 -0.78  -0.032 -2.18 b 
    CATA    -0.523 5.50 b -0.434 3.61 c 0.025 1.61  0.050 0.25  -0.390 -2.45 b 
    Z_SCORE -0.040 0.71  -0.017 0.13  -0.001 -1.06  0.017 0.90  -0.052 -2.70 a 
    NOT_UNQUAL 
 
  
 
     0.048 0.63  0.144 4.78 a 
    SPECIALIST          0.276 1.81 c 0.133 2.34 b 
    BIG4          -0.250 -1.65 c 0.314 4.58 a 
    INVMILLS -0.338 9.32 a 0.169 1.96  -0.017 -2.31 b -0.065 -0.77  -0.113 -1.49  
Adjusted R2/Pseudo-R2  0.535 
 
 0.219 
 
 0.226 
 
 0.136   0.778  
N  3,647 
 
 3,647 
 
 2,973 
 
 3,647   3,647  
WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the predicted value of WEDGE following Gompers et al. 
(2010) – see footnote 23 of this paper. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include an intercept, as well as year and industry 
indicator variables. Columns A and B report probit regressions; Columns C through E report regressions where test statistics and significance levels 
are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively (two-sided tests).  
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Table 4 
Matched Sample: Effects of Disproportionate Insider Control on Clients’ Demand for Audit Quality 
 
 Column A 
 
Column B 
 
Column C 
 
Column D  Column E  
Dependent Variable: BIG4  SPECIALIST  DEPEND  NA/AUDFEES  AUDFEES  
 
Coeff. 
est. 
Wald 
χ2 stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
Wald 
χ2 stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 
                
    WEDGE 0.121 0.91  0.291 4.90 b -0.020 -2.06 b -0.241 -2.18 b 0.204 2.52 b 
Controls                
    SIZE 0.509 860.67 a 0.148 92.21 a 0.010 6.73 a 0.135 7.48 a 0.382 36.30 a 
    M_to_B 0.001 0.25  -0.001 1.04  -0.001 -1.81 c -0.001 -1.33  0.001 0.94  
    LEVERAGE 0.966 64.57 a 0.159 0.97  0.018 3.44 a -0.061 -0.79  0.948 12.85 a 
    ROA -0.811 21.67 a -0.455 5.51 b 0.001 0.00  0.177 1.86 c -0.323 -4.46 a 
    FOREIGN 0.134 5.22 b 0.041 0.44  0.007 1.59  -0.097 -2.25 b 0.292 8.77 a 
    SEG -0.005 0.12  0.015 1.63  0.001 0.96  0.009 0.58  0.050 7.26 a 
    LOSS -0.028 0.21  -0.023 0.10  0.010 2.59 a 0.105 2.11 b 0.220 8.08 a 
    MA -0.060 0.65  -0.079 0.98  0.003 0.70  -0.042 -1.59  0.146 5.32 a 
    LITRISK 0.033 0.21  -0.370 18.90 a -0.005 -1.34  -0.043 -0.79  0.066 1.32  
    CAPINT -0.030 1.26  -0.001 0.00  0.001 0.74  0.008 0.39  -0.073 -5.03 a 
    CATA    -0.103 0.59  0.076 0.25  -0.008 -0.91  0.041 0.34  -0.164 -1.92 c 
    Z_SCORE -0.014 3.20 c -0.009 0.26  0.001 0.11  0.004 1.49  -0.013 -3.68 a 
    NOT_UNQUAL 
 
  
 
     -0.004 -0.10  0.159 7.18 a 
    SPECIALIST          0.235 2.89 a 0.106 2.61 a 
    BIG4          -0.161 -1.95 c 0.343 7.98 a 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo-R2  0.463 
 
 0.170 
 
 0.124 
 
 0.149   0.780  
N  6,320 
 
 6,320 
 
 5,200 
 
 6,320   6,320  
WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the difference between VR, the proportion of voting rights 
held by insiders, and CFR, the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include 
an intercept, as well as year and industry indicator variables. Columns A and B report probit regressions; Columns C through E report regressions 
where test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests).  
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Table 5 
Matched Sample: Effect of Disproportionate Insider Control and Demand for Audit Quality on Firm Value 
 
 
 Column A 
 
Column B 
 
Dependent Variable: TobinQ  Ln_TobinQ  
 
Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 
       
    WEDGE -0.355 -2.89 a -0.223 -3.84 a 
    WEDGE*AUDQUAL 0.804 3.75 a 0.327 2.78 a 
    AUDQUAL -0.168 -2.41 b -0.029 -1.07  
Controls       
    AT -0.026 -1.06  -0.007 -0.69  
    LEVERAGE 0.001 0.01  -0.029 -0.57  
    ROA 0.607 2.94 a 0.422 6.18 a 
    NEGEQUITY 0.970 8.21 a 0.488 10.18 a 
    R&D 5.625 6.62 a 2.297 9.24 a 
    CAPEX 3.615 5.39 a 1.683 6.14 a 
    ADVERTISING 2.529 3.07 a 1.258 4.09 a 
    DIV 2.766 5.10 a 1.458 7.86 a 
    ACQ 0.227 0.76  0.284 2.44 b 
    FIRMAGE -0.260 -4.20 a -0.084 -3.40 a 
    SP500 0.544 6.28 a 0.239 6.24 a 
Adjusted R2  0.307 
 
 0.345 
 
N  5,200 
 
 5,200 
 
WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights 
computed as the difference between VR, the proportion of voting rights held 
by insiders, and CFR, the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include an 
intercept, as well as year and industry indicator variables. Test statistics and 
significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) 
clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests).  
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Table 6 
Dual-Class Sample: Effects of Insider Voting Rights and Cash Flow Rights on Clients’ Demand for Audit Quality 
 
 Column A 
 
Column B 
 
Column C 
 
Column D  Column E  
Dependent Variable: BIG4  SPECIALIST  DEPEND  NA/AUDFEES  AUDFEES  
 
Coeff. 
est. 
Wald 
χ2 stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
Wald 
χ2 stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 
                
    VR 0.605 9.50 a 0.382 4.30 b -0.046 -2.67 a -0.472 -1.94 c 0.297 2.39 b 
    CFR -0.054 0.05  -1.04 17.00 a 0.009 0.55  0.537 2.20 b -0.493 -3.20 a 
Controls                
    SIZE 0.510 330.40 a 0.077 12.49 a 0.011 5.31 a 0.151 5.49 a 0.366 20.70 a 
    M_to_B -0.001 0.13  -0.002 0.66  0.001 0.75  0.001 1.27  -0.001 -1.01  
    LEVERAGE 0.948 7.91 a 0.453 2.02  0.041 3.19 a -0.132 -0.87  1.080 6.40 a 
    ROA -2.112 22.24 a -0.483 1.73  -0.010 -0.85  0.234 1.30  -0.601 -3.70 a 
    FOREIGN 0.279 9.76 a 0.052 0.35  0.008 1.13  -0.090 -0.97  0.315 6.11 a 
    SEG -0.007 0.17  0.026 2.77 c 0.002 0.86  0.006 0.22  0.052 4.94 a 
    LOSS -0.099 1.11  -0.004 0.00  0.008 1.97 b 0.102 1.55  0.177 4.42 a 
    MA 0.006 0.00  -0.231 3.98 b 0.006 1.30  -0.076 -1.68 c 0.109 2.77 a 
    LITRISK 0.266 5.34 b -0.455 10.75 a -0.003 -0.39  -0.135 -0.97  0.158 2.06 b 
    CAPINT -0.057 4.10 b -0.074 2.93 c 0.002 2.44 b -0.018 -0.75  -0.033 -2.36 b 
    CATA    -0.253 1.55  -0.239 1.20  -0.009 -0.63  0.023 0.12  -0.189 -1.33  
    Z_SCORE -0.045 0.87  -0.018 0.14  -0.002 -2.24 b 0.017 0.87  -0.051 -2.46 b 
    NOT_UNQUAL 
 
  
 
     0.043 0.62  0.146 4.81 a 
    SPECIALIST          0.286 1.91 c 0.132 2.16 b 
    BIG4          -0.238 -1.69 c 0.313 4.74 a 
    INVMILLS -0.382 12.32 a 0.134 1.29  -0.002 -0.25 
 
-0.075 -0.87  -0.154 -1.94 c 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo-R2  0.537 
 
 0.224 
 
 0.203 
 
 0.138   0.777  
N  3,674 
 
 3,647 
 
 2,973 
 
 3,647   3,647  
WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the difference between VR, the proportion of voting rights 
held by insiders, and CFR, the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include 
an intercept, as well as year and industry indicator variables. Columns A and B report probit regressions; Columns C through E report regressions 
where test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests).  
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Table 7 
Dual-Class Sample: Robustness Tests 
 
 
 Column A 
 
Column B 
 
Column C 
 
Column D  Column E  
Dependent Variable: BIG4  SPECIALIST  DEPEND  NA/AUDFEES  AUDFEES  
 
Coeff. 
est. 
Wald 
χ2 stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
Wald 
χ2 stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t-stat. 
 
                
    WEDGE 0.762 10.54 a 0.386 3.17 c -0.025 -1.78 c -0.427 -1.87 c 0.265 2.30 b 
Additional Controls                
    BSIZE 0.089 9.79 a 0.008 0.10  -0.002 -1.00  -0.025 -1.30  0.018 1.45  
    NUM_IND -0.036 1.34  0.050 3.65 c 0.006 2.78 a 0.056 2.14 b 0.056 3.99 a 
    CEO_IS_CHAIR -0.254 9.98 a -0.030 0.15  0.002 0.37  0.103 1.21  -0.012 -0.34  
    FAMILY -0.184 3.86 b -0.069 0.46  -0.002 -0.30  -0.067 -0.66  0.040 0.75  
    DAQ 0.033 0.91  -0.093 5.57 b -0.001 -1.14  0.001 0.06  0.025 2.68 a 
    RET_VOL -3.893 3.43 c 2.577 1.19  0.299 2.34 b 1.584 0.78  2.612 3.33 a 
    SPOS -0.219 2.35  -0.119 0.57  0.008 1.67 c 0.116 1.01  0.194 4.43 a 
    RESTATE -0.029 0.07  -0.016 0.02  0.004 1.00  -0.081 -2.00 b 0.109 3.98 a 
    IVs from model (3) Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Adjusted R2/Pseudo-R2  0.574 
 
 0.312 
 
 0.261 
 
 0.139   0.804  
N  3,593 
 
 3,593 
 
 2,933 
 
 3,593   3,593  
WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the difference between VR, the proportion of voting rights 
held by insiders, and CFR, the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All models include 
an intercept, all controls from Models 1 (Columns A through C) or 2 (Columns D and E), as well as year and industry indicator variables. Columns 
A and B report probit regressions; Columns C through E report regressions where test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on 
standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided 
tests).  
 
